

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-12

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EUR-25 /144 W

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DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED

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TAGS: MOPS, PFOR, XF, IS

SUBJECT: DAYAN DESCRIBES ISRAEL'S WAR

1. SUMMARY: STRIKING ELEMENT IN DAYAN'S REMARKS IN HIS OCT 14 TELEVISION INTERVIEW IN HEBREW IS HIS PREDICTION THAT WAR WILL NOT END WITH AN AGREED CEASEFIRE BUT THROUGH ARAB EXHAUSTION AND CONSEQUENT ARAB CESSATION OF FIRING. PICTURE HE PAINTED OF WAR'S TERMINATION HAS ISRAEL DELIVERING DECISIVE, MASSIVE BLOW TO ENEMY FORCES-- BUT ALSO INCLUDES POSSIBILITY OF FAR HEAVIER MOBILIZATION THAN NOW EXISTS BOTH INSIDE ISRAEL AND OF HELP FROM WORLD JEWRY, IMPLYING A LONG AND COSTLY WAR FOR ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

2. ON WAY WAR WILL END, DAYAN SAID:

(A) QUOTE. I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT, EVEN HAVING BEEN HIT SO HARD, SYRIA WILL WISH FOR AND AGREE TO A CEASDEIRE. IT MAY BE THAT SHE WILL WISH TO LEAVE THE OPTIONS OPEN AND THE ACTION UNFINISHED. IN VIEW OF THE MOBILIZATION OF THE ARAB WORLD, I AM NOT WILLING TO STATE WITH CERTAINTY THAT WHAT HAPPENED IN THE SIX-DAY WAR, -- NAMELY THAT, AFTER THE CRUSHING BLOW THEY RECEIVED, THEY REQUESTED A CEASEFIRE--

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WILL OCCUR AGAIN. END QUOTE.

(B) QUOTE. IT MAY BE THAT THERE WILL BE NO PAPER SIGNED, BUT IF A SITUATION SHOULD ARISE WHEN THEY CAN NO LONGER PHYSICALLY OPEN FIRE, THEY WILL NOT START FIRING. THE QUESTION IS, ACTUALLY, WHAT REALITY WILL EXIST, AND NOT WHAT PIECE OF PAPER WILL, OR WILL NOT, BE SIGNED. END QUOTE.

(C) QUOTE. I AM NOT SURE THAT WHAT WE HAVE WITNESSED IN THE PAST, NAMELY THAT THE ARABS DO NOT WISH TO MAKE PEACE-- MAY NOT BE DEVELOPING INTO A FURTHER STAGE, MAINLY THAT THEY MAY NOT WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE A CEASEFIRE. THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE, BUT THEY REFUSED TO MAKE PEACE, IT MAY BE THAT NOW THEY MIGHT NOT WISH TO ACCEPT A FORMAL CEASEFIRE. THUS, JUST AS IN THE PAST WE ENJOYED A STATED OF DE FACTO PEACE, THOUGH A BAD PEACE, WHICH THEY REFUSED TO TURN INTO A FORMAL PEACE, I THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT A SITUATION MAY ARISE IN WHICH THEY WILL NOT SIGN A CEASEFIRE, THOUGH FIRING WILL CEASE AS A RESULT OF THEIR INABILITY, NOT SO MUCH TO OPEN FIRE, BUT TO STAND UP AGAINST US IN ACTION. IN OTHER WORDS, SORT OF OPEN SITUATION, FOR ALONG TIME AT LEAST. END QUOTE.

3. ON PUNISHMENT ISRAEL WILL ADMINISTER TO ENEMY, DAYAN SAID:

(A) QUOTE. IN EXACT -- TERMS, IT IS OUR AIM THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO CAUSE THEM TO BE HIT SO HARD THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO THINK OF WAR, AND SHOULD DESIRE A PEACE SETTLEMENT. END QUOTE.

(B) QUOTE. ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT, THE DECISION HAS NOT YET FALLEN, AND IF ASSUME THAT THE DECISION THERE WILL ALSO BE FAR MORE MEANINGFUL AND UNAMBIGUOUS... IN MY ESTIMATE IT WILL NOT BE LONG BEFORE WE COME TO THE ACTUAL DECISIVE ARMOR BATTLE. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO BE AN EGYPTIAN AT THE END OF THAT DAY OF FIGHTING. END QUOTE.

(C) QUOTE. NOT ONLY ARE THE SYRIANS ALREADY DEFENDING DAMASCUS, BUT THERE WILL ALSO BE A SERIOUS, DECISIVE BATTLE IN EGYPT, WHICH WILL REMAIN IN THEIR MEMORIES, AND WHICH THEY SHALL NOT LOOK BACK TO WITH PLEASURE. END QUOTE.

4. ON LIKELY NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ISRAELI MOBILIZATION, DAYAN SAID:

(A) QUOTE. I DO THINK THAT IN THE LONG RUN WE OUGHT TO BE PREPARED FOR FAR HEAVIER MOBILIZATION, NOT ONLY OF OUR PEOPLE HERE IN ISRAEL, BUT ALSO OF THE WHOLE OF THE JEWISH UNCLASSIFIED

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NATION. END QUOTE.

(B) QUOTE. IN THIS SITUATION, AND WITH ALL THIS HEAVY HIGH TECHNOLOGY SOVIET SUPPORT, IT MAY BE THAT WE WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH THIS A LONG TIME, AND WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DO SO -- BUT WE WILL ALSO NEED THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL THE ASSISTANCE OUR FRIENDS CAN GIVE US, NOT IN MEN BUT IN EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS THE SUPPORT OF THE JEWISH NATION AND OUR PEOPLE IN ISRAEL. END QUOTE.

5. OTHER MAIN TOPIC COVERED BY DAYAN, TO WHICH HE DEVOTED ROUGHLY HALF OF INTERVIEW, WAS IMPORTANT DOMESTIC ISSUE HERE OF WHETHER ISRAEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN BETTER MILITARY POSITION AT OUTBREAK OF WAR. HE HANDLED THIS WELL BY POINTING OUT THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT HAVE AFFORDED ECONOMICALLY TO HAVE STAYED FULLY MOBILIZED FROM 1971 ON (BY WHICH TIME ARABS POSED REAL THREAT), OR POLITICALLY TO HAVE LAUNCHED PREVENTIVE WAR AT SOME POINT IN 1971-1973. QUOTE. WE DO NOT HAVE THAT MANY FRIENDS (ABROAD), AND IF WE HAD STARTED THE WAR, I DOUBT THAT WE WOULD HAVE RECEIVED APPLAUSE, SUPPORT, AND IDENTIFICATION WITH OUR CAUSE. END QUOTE.

6. DAYAN EXPLAINED ISRAEL DID JUST THE RIGHT THING IN 1971-1973: IT KEPT BUILDING IDF INTO FINE FIGHTING FORCE. IN THIS ENDEAVOR, HE SAID ISRAEL HAD BEEN BY AND LARGE SUCCESSFUL, ALTHOUGH QUOTE THERE ARE THINGS WE DO NOT HAVE, THAT WE ASKED FOR AND DID NOT RECEIVE-- CERTAIN KINDS OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, PERSONAL EQUIPMENT THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE, THAT THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN BY THE USSR, AND WE OURSELVES CANNOT PRODUCE AND HAVE NOT RECEIVED FROM ANYONE ELSE. END QUOTE. CRITICISM OF US WHICH SOME ISRAELIS MIGHT READ INTO THIS REMARK MUST HAVE BEEN CANCELLED BY "APPRECIATION AND GRATITUDE". DAYAN WAS QUOTED OVER ISRAELI RADIO OCT 14 AS HAVING EXPRESSED IN ANOTHER INTERVIEW, WHEN ASKED ABOUT ADEQUACY OF US SUPPORT.  
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